1
2 -comprehension appears to be the main stumbling block 2 on the road to understanding full comprehension, giving hope for an ordinal analysis of Z 2 in the foreseeable future.
Roughly speaking, ordinally informative proof theory attaches ordinals in a recursive representation system to proofs in a given formal system; transformations on proofs to certain canonical forms are then partially mirrored by operations on the associated ordinals. Among other things, ordinal analysis of a formal system serves to characterize its provably recursive ordinals, functions and functionals and can yield both conservation and combinatorial independence results. Since there is no wide familiarity among logicians with ordinally informative proof theory, we begin in §2 with an explanation of its current rationale and goals, which take the place of the original Received June 1, 1995; revised September 27, 1995. The author is a Heisenberg Fellow of the German Science Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft). 1 I would like to thank Tim Carlson for innumerable and invaluable conversations which have helped me find my way through Π 1 2 . Carlson is completing work on an approach to Π 1 2 comprehension which was developed independently of that presented here. 2 Hilbert Program, and follow that in §3 with an explanation of its basic technical tools, namely ordinal representation systems and ramified set theory equipped with suitable reflection rules. The connection of the system of Π 1 2 -comprehension (Π 1 2 − CA hereafter) with set theory comes through the fact that KP + Σ 1 -separation is a conservative extension of Π 1 2 − CA + BI, where BI is the so-called principle of Bar Induction. It is indicated in §4 how this fragment of set theory can be sliced into a hierarchy of reflection principles. Then §5 describes in outline an ordinal representation system which serves for the ordinal analyses of KP + Σ 1 -separation. Most important in this regard are certain projection functions (often called collapsing functions). As their existence is rather difficult to prove, in §6 we will indicate a model for them based on very large cardinals, in which they can be construed as inverses of certain partial elementary embeddings.
To set the stage for the following, a very brief history of ordinal-theoretic proof theory since Gentzen reads as follows: In the 1950's proof theory flourished in the hands of Schütte: in [35] he introduced an infinitary system for first order number theory with the so-called -rule, which had already been proposed by Hilbert [16] . Ordinals were assigned as lengths to derivations and via cut-elimination he re-obtained Gentzen's ordinal analysis for number theory in a particularly transparent way. Further, Schütte extended his approach to systems of ramified analysis and brought this technique to perfection in his monograph "Beweistheorie" [36] . Independently, in 1964 Feferman [6] and Schütte [37, 38] determined the ordinal bound Γ 0 for theories of autonomous ramified progressions.
A major breakthrough was made by Takeuti in 1967, who for the first time obtained an ordinal analysis of an impredicative theory. In [42] he gave an ordinal analysis of Π 1 1 comprehension, extended in 1973 to ∆ 1 2 comprehension in [44] jointly with Yasugi. For this Takeuti returned to Gentzen's method of assigning ordinals (ordinal diagrams, to be precise) to purported derivations of the empty sequent (inconsistency).
The next wave of results, which concerned theories of iterated inductive definitions, were obtained by Buchholz, Pohlers, and Sieg in the late 1970's (see [4] ). Takeuti's methods of reducing derivations of the empty sequent ("the inconsistency") were extremely difficult to follow, and therefore a more perspicuous treatment was to be hoped for. Since the use of the infinitary -rule had greatly facilitated the ordinal analysis of number theory, new infinitary rules were sought. In 1977 (see [2] ) Buchholz introduced such rules, dubbed Ω-rules to stress the analogy. They led to a proof-theoretic treatment of a wide variety of systems, as exemplified in the monograph [5] by Buchholz and Schütte. Yet simpler infinitary rules were put forward a few years later by Pohlers, leading to the method of local predicativity, which proved to be a very versatile tool (see [25, 24, 26] ). With the work of Jäger and Pohlers (see [17, 18, 20] ) the forum of ordinal analysis then switched from the realm of second-order arithmetic to set theory, shaping what is now called admissible proof theory, after the models of Kripke-Platek set theory, KP. Their work culminated in the analysis of the system with ∆ 1 2 -comprehension plus BI [20] . In essence, admissible proof theory is a gathering of cut-elimination techniques for infinitary calculi of ramified set theory with Σ-and/or Π 2 -reflection rules 3 that lend itself to ordinal analyses of theories of the form KP+ "there are x many admissibles" or KP+ "there are many admissibles." By way of illustration, the subsystem of analysis with ∆ 1 2 -comprehension and Bar Induction can be couched in such terms, for it is naturally interpretable in the set theory KPi := KP + ∀y∃z(y∈z ∧ z is admissible) (cf. [20] ).
After an intermediate step [29] , which dealt with a set theory KPM which formalizes a recursively Mahlo universe, a major step beyond admissible proof theory was taken in [32] . That paper featured ordinal analyses of extensions of KP by Π n -reflection. A generalization of the methods of [32] underlies the treatment of Π Once one is investigating theories which have at least the strength of ∆ 1 2 − CA + BI, it is obvious that "securing" ordinary mathematics is not the main concern. Even without knowledge of that program carried out under the rubric of "reverse mathematics," it is easily seen that most of ordinary mathematics can be formalized in ∆ 1 2 − CA + BI without effort (note that in the context of second order arithmetic BI serves the same purpose as ∈-induction in set theory). So we must be interested in these strong impredicative principles for their own sake.
The reductions we have in mind, underlies a broadened view of "constructivity." There is no once-and-for-all delineated system of constructivism, rather it is an open-ended framework such as Martin-Löf's type theory, where new types along with new forms of inferences might be added as we widen our horizon by reaching higher levels of reflection (a constructivist's large cardinal program). However, space limitations do not permit us to dwell on a constructivist's manifesto of a liberal persuasion. Ad (II): It has been shown that certain large cardinal axioms settle questions about definable sets of reals, in that they imply the axiom of projective determinacy (see [22] ). The existence of infinitely many Woodin cardinals implies that every uncountable projective set of reals is Lebesgue measurable and has a perfect subset, and thus possesses the same cardinality as the continuum (see [45] ). However, it is as yet to be shown that the strength of large cardinal axioms has interesting repercussions in the context of arithmetic. A hope in connection with ordinal analyses is that they lead to new combinatorial principles which encapsulate considerable proof-theoretic strength. Examples are still scarce. One case where ordinal notations led to a new combinatorial result was Friedman's extension of Kruskal's Theorem, EKT, which asserts that finite trees are well-quasi-ordered under gap embeddability (see [40] ). The gap condition imposed on the embeddings is directly related to an ordinal notation system that was used for the analysis of Π 1 1 -comprehension. The principle EKT played a crucial role in the proof of the graph minor theorem of Robertson and Seymour (see [12] ).
. . of finite graphs there exist i < j so that G i is isomorphic to a minor of G j .
Ad (III):
There is a proof theory for extensions of KP. Up till now there does not exist a proof theory of ZFC with its essential use of the power set axiom. As a matter of fact, the flow of ideas has been in the other direction as ordinal-theoretic proof theory has been constructivizing notions of large cardinals. However, if one takes a bold optimistic view that proof theory can be developed up to very large cardinals, then proof theory might shed new light on these lofty regions. For instance, one could hope for new insights as to Kunen's proof of the impossibility of a non-trivial elementary embedding of the universe into itself. All known proofs of ¬∃j ( j : V ≺ V ∧ j = id ) have an ad hoc flavor. §3. Admissible proof theory. First order number theory is distinguished by the fact that its realm of discourse is clearly delineated, and moreover, that each element n of its realm possesses a canonical name, the nth numeral n. By contrast, the universe of a set theory is at most implicitly described by its axioms. 5 When searching for an analogue of the -rule, (for all n: ⊢ φ(n) ⇒ ⊢ ∀xφ(x)), for systems of set theory, one gets confronted with the problem of "naming" sets. However, if a set of ordinals or an ordinal representation system OR is given at the outset, one can build its associated formal constructible hierarchy, the RS OR -terms, as follows: For each α ∈ OR, L α is an RS OR -term of level α, and, if s 1 , · · · , s n are RS OR -terms with levels < α and if F (a, b 1 , · · · , b n ) is a formula of the ordinary set-theoretic language, then the formal expression [x∈L α :
where the superscript L α makes all unrestricted quantifiers in F become restricted to L α and a 1 , · · · , a n are the sets denoted by s 1 , · · · , s n , respectively. Aside from some notational conventions, we are now prepared to introduce the calculus of ramified set theory, RS OR . The conventions are that for an RS OR -term t, | t | denotes its level, t∈T α := {t : | t | < α}, and for terms s, t with | s | < | t | we set s 
The rules of RS OR are pure infinitary logic and therefore this calculus enjoys cut-elimination. But unlike the case of first order number theory, in general, we won't be able to embed KP into RS OR . We will have to add non-logical rules, Σ-reflection rules (cf. [1, I.4.1]), to RS OR in order to accommodate KP. However, the addition of such rules, providing OR is recursive, will render the infinitary calculus inconsistent, unless we impose uniformity restrictions on infinitary derivations. To explain this kind of uniformity, rather than construing OR as an initial segment of the ordinals it is important to conceive of OR as a subset of the ordinals which has gaps.
To make the preceding more understandable, we shall expound to some extent on a concrete example, the ordinal analysis of KPi. To begin with, we shall explain how a sufficiently strong ordinal representation system comes about. Recall that the least standard model of KPi is the structure L I , where I denotes the first recursively inaccessible ordinal.
Let α → Ω α be the function that enumerates the admissible ordinals and their limits, and let ℜ be the set of admissible ordinals κ so that < κ ≤ I. Variables κ, will range over ℜ. An ordinal representation system for the analysis of KPi can be derived from the following sets of ordinals, defined by recursion on α:
It is non-trivial to show that for any ∈ ℜ satisfying ∈ C (α, ), one has (α) < (see [30, 31] ). Note that if = (α) < , then [ , )∩C (α, ) = ∅, thus the order-type of the ordinals below which belong to the Skolem hull C (α, ) is . In more pictorial terms, is the αth collapse of .
Let ε I+1 be the least ordinal α > I such that α = α. C (ε I+1 , 0) gives rise to an ordinal representation system, i.e., there is a primitive recursive ordinal representation system OR, < ,R,ˆ , . . . , so that
". . . " is supposed to indicate that more structure carries over to the ordinal representation system. The ordinal analysis of KPi (cf. [20] ) establishes a close connection between KPi and OR. Thus, in view of of the isomorphism ∼ = one is led to ask how KPi relates to C (ε I+1 , 0). We will say that an ordinal
and KPi ⊢ ∃!xφ(x) (see [1, II.5.13] ). It turns out that all ordinals α ∈ C (ε I+1 , 0) have a canonical good Σ 1 -definition in KPi, arising from the definition of the Skolem hulls C (α, ) (see [30, 31, 34] ), but the reverse inclusion doesn't hold. For the time being, the general relation between KPi and C (ε I+1 , 0) remains to be unveiled.
Returning to the main track, to allow for an interpretation of KPi in the infinitary calculus, we add the following rules:
The rules (¬Ad) and (Ad) just introduce a new predicate whose meaning is the class {L : ∈ℜ}. New strength is only gained by the rules (Ref Σ(L ) ). An infinitary derivation D is said to be a C (α, )-derivation if it belongs to the calculus RS OR , where OR = C (α, ). Variations of the parameters α and will allow us to convey a notion of uniformity.
What is meant by blowing-up is best explained by the reverse process, i.e., mutilation. If D is obtained from D ′ by deleting in all inferences (∀), ( / ∈), and (¬Ad) of D ′ all those premises (together with the subproofs of which they are conclusions) which involve terms that do not belong to OR = C (α, ), then D is said to arise by mutilation from D ′ . The finite derivations of KPi can be unwound to yield C (0, 0)-uniform infinitary derivations. The whole process of (partial) cut-elimination, starting with the embedded KPi derivations, can then be carried out with C (α, 0)-uniform derivations, where α stays in the ordinal representation system C (ε I+1 , 0), though, as the cut-elimination process progresses, α propagates to ever bigger ordinals.
Hopefully, the preceding has conveyed some understanding of why the ordinal representation systems should be viewed together with their gaps.
Of course, the vocabulary we have just used is familiar from Girard's notion of -proof and the categorical framework of dilators (see [13] ). The problem of forging notions of uniformity for infinitary derivations is ubiquitous in this area of proof theory. -proofs, however, are too weak a tool, if one aims beyond admissible proof theory. The novel feature needed is that as the cut-elimination procedure progresses we not only require the insertion of more ordinals but also of completely new reflection rules. This means that the cut-elimination process amounts to a very complicated transformation process which cannot be subsumed under the heading of -proofs.
Fortunately, Buchholz has provided us with a very elegant and flexible setting for describing uniformity in infinitary proofs, called operator controlled derivations (see [3] ).
Definition 3.2. Let P(On) = {X : X is a set of ordinals}. A class function H : P(On) → P(On) will be called an operator if H is a closure operator, i.e., monotone, inclusive and idempotent, and satisfies the following conditions for all X ∈ P(On): 0 ∈ H(X ), and, if α has Cantor normal form
. . , α n ∈ H(X ). The latter ensures that H(X ) will be closed under + and →
, and decomposition of its members into additive and multiplicative components. To facilitate the definition of H-controlled derivations, we assign to each RS OR -formula A, either a (possibly infinite) disjunction (A ) ∈I or a conjunction (A ) ∈I of RS OR -formulae. This assignment will be indicated by A ∼ = (A ) ∈I and A ∼ = (A ) ∈I , respectively. Define: r∈t ∼ = (s
Using this representation of formulae, we can define the subformulae of a formula as follows. When A ∼ = (A ) ∈I or A ∼ = (A ) ∈I , then B is a subformula of A if B ≡ A or, for some ∈I , B is a subformula of A .
Since one also wants to keep track of the complexity of cuts appearing in derivations, each formula F gets assigned an ordinal rank rk(F ) which is the sup of the level of terms in F plus a finite number.
Using the formula representation, in spite of the many rules of RS OR , the notion of H-controlled derivability can be defined concisely. We shall use I ↾ α to denote the set { ∈I : | | < α}. Definition 3.3. Let H be an operator and let Γ be a finite set of RS ORformulae. H α Γ is defined by recursion on α. It is always demanded that
The inductive clauses are:
The specification of the operators needed for an ordinal analysis will of course hinge upon the particular theory and ordinal representation system. §4. Beyond admissible proof theory. The following gives a heuristic plan for approaching the ordinal analysis of a set theory T :
• Study the standard/canonical models of T in set-theoretic terms.
• Carry out an analysis of the impredicative principles of T .
• Determine an ordering of degrees of impredicativity.
• Distill an ordinal representation system from the previous ordering.
• Develop an infinitary proof system, based on a formal constructible hierarchy, in such a way that degrees of impredicativity are mirrored by reflection rules.
• Show (partial) cut-elimination for the proof system.
As for the degrees of impredicativity, all systems from KP through KPi have degree 1, KPM has degree 2, whereas the system of Π 3 reflection in [32] already has transfinitely many degrees of impredicativity. In the following, we will gradually slice Π The ordinals κ such that L κ |= KP + Σ 1 -separation are familiar from ordinal recursion theory. They are exactly the nonprojectible ordinals > . Definition 4.2. An admissible ordinal κ is said to be nonprojectible if there is no total κ-recursive function mapping κ one-one into some < κ, where a function g :
The key to the 'largeness' properties of nonprojectible ordinals is that for any nonprojectible ordinal κ, L κ is a limit of Σ 1 -elementary substructures, i.e., for every < κ there exists
Such ordinals satisfying L ≺ 1 L κ have strong reflecting properties. For instance, if L |= φ for some set-theoretic sentence φ (possibly containing parameters from L ), then there exists a < such that
The last result makes it clear that an ordinal analysis of Π 1 2 -comprehension would necessarily involve a proof-theoretic treatment of reflections beyond those surfacing in admissible proof theory.
The notion of stability will be instrumental.
For our purposes we need refinements of this notion, the simplest being provided by:
, where φ is Π n (Σ n ), and Tran(z) expresses that z is a transitive set.
Π n -reflection for all n suffices to express one step in the ≺ 1 relation.
With regard to refining the notion of being -stable, however, the constructible hierarchy causes some minor annoyance since we want the Σ n satisfaction relation on L to be uniformly Σ n -definable in L and likewise we want the predicate "x = L α " to be absolute at all stages. The way out of this dilemma is to use the Jensen hierarchy (cf. [21] ). Roughly speaking, J possesses all the properties of the limit levels of the L-hierarchy. However, in the infinitary proof system we can neglect the difference between the L and the J hierarchies. Definition 4.6. κ is said to be -Π n -reflecting if whenever φ(u, x) is a set-theoretic Π n -formula, which may contain parameters from J κ , and a 1 , . . . , a r ∈ J κ+ and J κ+ |= φ[κ, a 1 , . . . , a n ], then there exists κ 0 , 0 < κ and b 1 , . . . , b r ∈ J κ 0 + 0 such that J κ 0 + 0 |= φ[κ 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n ] with the parameters of φ(u, x) belonging to J κ 0 .
Putting the previous definition to work, one gets:
At this point let us return to proof theory to explain the need for even further refinements of the preceding notions. Recall that the first nonprojectible ordinal is a limit of smaller ordinals n such that L n ≺ 1 L . In the ordinal representation system for Π 1 2 − CA, there will be symbols E n and E for n and , respectively. The associated infinitary proof system RS OR will have rules
where φ(x) is Π n , possibly containing RS OR -terms of levels < E n , and < E . These rules suffice to bring about the embedding of KP + Σ 1 -separation in the infinitary proof system, but reflection rules galore will be needed to carry out cut-elimination. For example, there will be "many" ordinals , ∈ OR that play the role of -Π n+1 -reflecting ordinals by virtue of corresponding reflection rules in RS OR . Assume now that there is an infinitary proof D of an arithmetic statement and that further D contains -Π n+1 -reflection inferences at . To eliminate cuts in D one has to eliminate those reflection inferences, too. Let D 0 be a subproof of D whose conclusion is the premise of a -Π n+1 -reflection inference at . Since D 0 is a uniform proof, we know more than the sheer truth of its conclusion. Hopefully, this uniformity will enable one to "project" the proof tree below . This, however, is mostly wishful thinking. To aggravate matters, assume further that D 0 already contains several -Π n+1 -reflection inferences at . Well, then it is, in general, impossible to project D 0 below , for otherwise we could repeat this procedure to produce an infinite decending chain of ordinals. The remedy is to replace those inferences by a hierarchy of inferences which are between -Π n+1 -reflection and -Π n -reflection. This leads to the following: Definition 4.8. Let A ⊆ κ × κ. κ is said to be -Π n -reflecting in A if in Definition 4.6 the requirement κ 0 , 0 ∈ A is added.
Lemma 4.9. Still assuming that is -Π n+1 -reflecting, suppose ϑ(u) is Π n+1 (J ) and for every α < , J + |= ϑ(α). Recursively define
Then, for all α < , is -Π n+1 -reflecting in A α ϑ . The proof is by induction on α. As a matter of fact, it will be important to extend the hierarchy beyond for certain ordinals α. This hierarchy has a counterpart in the ordinal representation system. There the formula ϑ(α) will refer to the αth Skolem hull of ordinals. §5. Skolem hulls and projection functions. It makes no sense to present an ordinal representation system without giving a semantic interpretation. For ordinal representation systems in impredicative proof theory it is essential to understand the collapsing functions which they encapsulate. In this section, the intention is to give a glimpse, in terms of Skolem hulls, of the ordinal representation system needed for Π 1 2 − CA. Let (E α ) α< be a chain of Σ 1 -elementary ordinals, i.e., L α ≺ 1 L holds for all α < < , and let be a primitive recursive ordinal. will be kept fixed in the sequel.
Definition 5.1. By recursion on α we shall define sets of ordinals C (α, ) (the α th Skolem Hull generated from ), a set ℜ α of reflection configurations and a set F α consisting of triples ( , A , f) such that ≤ α, A ∈ ℜ α and f is a partial function; such triples will be called collapsing functions.
The definition of F will actually guarantee that for any α and A ∈ ℜ there is at most one f satisfying (α, A , f) ∈ F. This justifies the following definition:
Let's stipulate some conventions for ease of presentation. Instead of (α, A , f) ∈ F we shall sloppily write Ψ α A ∈ F. A reflection configuration A is related to a certain reflection context which determines its interval. Formally, A is a formal expression built up from ordinals, symbols Π n and parentheses. By A ∈ C (α, ) we mean that any ordinal occurring in A belongs to C (α, ).
Let E = {E : = 0 or = E +1 for some < }. C n (α, ) is defined by recursion on n as follows:
The burden is now on us to define ℜ α and F α . We shall focus on one type of reflection situation. Suppose ∈ E or is -Π n+1 -reflecting, but not stronger, and = Ψ B (κ), + = Ψ B (κ + ) for some B , where [κ, κ + ] is the interval of the reflection configuration B ∈ ℜ <α . Then A ∈ ℜ α , where A is just a matrix that comprises the information from B and the data , ,
The definition of Ψ α A is the crucial part. It begins with a search for pairs of ordinals 0 , 0 below so that
and 0 is 0 -Π n -reflecting (the latter reflection property is actually way too weak). The meaning of (7) is that there is a gap in C (α, 0 ) between 0 and . The purpose of the function Ψ Necessarily, in the present paper, the description of Ψ α A has to fade out at a certain point. But it should be clear by now, that Ψ α A will enable us to project certain proofs, which are C (α, )-uniform, below . To conclude, let us exhibit the set of ordinals from which the ordinal representation system is obtained. In this final section we will indicate a model for the projection functions, employing rather sweeping large cardinal axioms, in that we shall presume the existence of certain strongly indescribable cardinals. Large cardinals have been used quite frequently in the definition procedure of strong ordinal representation systems, and large cardinal notions have been an important source of inspiration. In the end, they can be dispensed with, but they add an intriguing twist to the relation between set theory and proof theory. The advantage of working in a strong set-theoretic context is that we can build models without getting buried under complexity considerations.
Definition 6.1. Let V = α∈On V α be the cumulative hierarchy of sets. Let > 0 and F be a collection of formulae. A cardinal κ will be called -F -shrewd if for all P ⊆ V κ and every F -formula ϕ(X, y), whenever
then there exist 0 < κ 0 , 0 < κ such that
κ is said to be -F -reducible if for every P ⊆ V κ+ there exist 0 < κ 0 , 0 < κ and Q ⊆ V κ 0 + 0 such that
where ≡ F means that both structures satisfy the same F sentences. Observe that (8) 
κ is shrewd (reducible) if κ is -F -shrewd (κ is -F -reducible) for any > 0 with F being the set-theoretic formulae.
To our knowledge the previous large cardinal notions have not been considered in the set-theoretic literature. With regard to consistency strength, shrewd cardinals are weaker than for instance subtle or ineffable cardinals; in particular is their existence compatible with the constructibility of the universe. The notions of Definition 6.1 are closely related.
Lemma 6.2. If κ is -shrewd and 0 < < , then κ is -reducible.
In the situation of (8) to convey (8) and to indicate that p is the induced map defined on the F -definable elements of V κ 0 + 0 ; ∈; κ 0 ; Q; x x∈V κ 0 and p sends κ 0 to κ.
When rendered as in (9), reducibility bears a resemblance to supercompactness due to the following pullback property of supercompact cardinals: 
